State of Utah v. Thomas F. Dyer : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1983
State of Utah v. Thomas F. Dyer : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Ronald R. Stanger; Attorney for Appellant;
David L. Wilkinson; Attorney for Respondent;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, State v. Dyer, No. 18337 (Utah Supreme Court, 1983).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3032
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATB OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, • 
• 
Plaintiff-Respondent, • • 
-v- • Case No. 18337 • 
THOMAS P. nY~R, • 
• 
Defendant-Appellant. • • 
BRIEF OF RESPONDRNT 
Appeal from a conviction of Negligent Homicide in 
the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, the 
Honorable J. Robert Bullock, Ju~ge, presiding. 
RONALD R. STAN~ER 
42 North University Avenue 
P.O. ~x 477 
Provo, UT 84601 
Attorney for Appellant 
DAVIn L. WIL~INSON 
Attorney r~neral 
RO~ERT N. PARRIR~ 
Assistant Attorney General 
2~6 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TARLF, OF' CON~ENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE • • • • • • • • • • 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COUR~. • • • • • • • • • • • • 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
-
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT MAY, AT ITS DISCRETION, 






REQUF.STED RY DEFENSE COUNSEL OR NOT • • • • 5 
POINT II. NE~LIGENT HOMICID~ IS A LESSER OFFENSE 
INCLUDED IN THE OFFENSE OF MANSLATJnHTER • • 
POINT III. THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A 
VERDICT OF GUILTY TO THE CHARGE OF NEnLIGENT 
8 
HOMICIDE. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 13 
CONCLUSION. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Cases Cited 
Green v. United States, 355 u.s. 184 (1957) • • • • • • State v. Boggess, Utah, fl 55 P.2d f\54 ( 19 A2) • • • • • • 
State v. Howarrt, Utah, 597 P.2d B7R ( l~ ;q) • • • • • • • State v. Rowell, TJtah, 649 P.2d 91 (19R2) • • • • • • • 
State v. Whitman, 93 Utah 557, 74 P.2d 696 (1937) 
• • • 
Statutes Cited 
Utah Code Ann., ~ 76-1-4 02 (1953), as amended 
• • • • • 
" " " s 76-2-103 " " " • • • • • 
n n II ~ "?6- ~-20 3 " " II • • • • • 
" 
n II E; '7f;-5-205 II n n 
• • • • • 














Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 




-v- • . 
THOMAS P. OYER, • 
• 
Defendant-Appellant. • • 
BRIEF OF RESPONDF.NT 
Appeal from a conviction of Negligent Homicide in 
the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, the 
Honorable J. Robert Bullock, Judge, presiding. 
RONALD R. RTANGER 
42 North University Avenue 
P • (') • Box 4 7 7 
Provo, UT 84601 
Attorney for Appellant 
DAVID L. WILKINSOU 
Attorney General 
ROBERT N. PARRISH 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT R4114 
Attorneys for Reppon~ent 
MAR 301983 
_ _J_,~_3]7 
f'<' \ ('" ....... --.;·----~ 
. , ':2J' .• , >'!"'\.-~!;"'\ r"...c··-~ fl I• ' 
~'4 • ...llt-;, 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREMR COTJRT OF '!'HE STATE OF UTAH 




-v- • case No • 18337 • 




BRIEF' OF RESPONnENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was originally charged with Murder in the 
second degree, a first-degree felony, in violation of Utah 
coae Ann. ~ 7n-5-203 (lq53), as amended, in the shooting 
death of Nina Marie Fuelleman. The charge was later amended 
to manslaughter, a second-degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Cone Ann.,~ 76-~-2ns (1953), as amenaen. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOHER COTJRT 
Appellant was tried without a jury on March 3 and 4, 
1982, the Honorable J. Robert Rullock presiding, in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court. Appellant was convicted of 
manslaughter on March 4, 1Q02. Sentence of one year in the 
Utah county Jail and a $1,000 fine were imposed on March 2n, 
1982. A Certificate of Probable Cause was granted on April 
13, 198?. ann execution of the sentence stayed pendinq this 
appeal. 
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REI.1 IRF ROUGHT ON APPF.AL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming 
the judgment of the court below. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the evening of August 20, 19A2, appellant, his 
brother Rob, and Nina Fuelleman went to a private club in 
American Fork for cocktails (R. 2A6). All three drank and Rob 
testified that he was mildly intoxicated, but that appellant 
"was in the bag" (R. 286, 304). nn the way home, at 
approximately l:no to 1:15 a.m. of August 21, appellant ~rove 
the car (R. 2R7, 28R). When the three reached the house in 
which appellant and Rob lived, appellant announced he was 
going to his girlfriend's home and Roh took the car keys away 
from him (R. 284, 288). An argument ensued in which appellant 
threw money and crumpled checks at Rob (R. 28q). Rob grabbed 
appellant hy the throat because he "couldn't get a word in 
edqewise" and proceeded to strangle and hit appellant (~. ~RQ-
2qn). A neighbor testified that she heard male voices coming 
from Rob and appellant's house at approximately 1:30 a.m., a 
minute or two after she observed people getting out of a car 
and entering the house (R. 277, 27R). The voices were saying 
"I'm going to get this Fucking thing over with. I'm tired of 
being lied to." " I haven't been lying to you." "The Fuck you 
haven't" (R. 279). 
-2-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
After hitting appellant several times, Rob let him 
go because he "felt sorry for taking advantage of him" (R. 
290). Less than 30 seconds after the fighting stopped, Rob 
went to the doorway of appellant's hedroom and saw him backing 
out of the closet with a gun in his hand (R. ~91-292). The 
gun was a 30-30 caliber Winchester Western rifle CR. 314). 
Approximately 10 seconds later, :R.ob saw the gun explode (R. 
294). Appellant was stanning near a dresser, the top arawer 
of which was standinq open when the police officers arrived, 
when the shot was fired (R. 240-241, 292). The drawer 
contained two spent cartridges and a box of 30-30 caliber 
ammunition (R. 241). On the floor, near the closet, was a gun 
scabbara (R. 23Q; see also Exhibit 14). Rob testified that 
the gun was heln above appellant's hip hut below his shoulder 
(R. 297). Rob did not see or hear the gun being loaded or 
cocked nor did he remember anything being said by an)1one 
during that time (R. 2~7). The neighbor testified that she 
heard a male voice say "Fuck. Not that. not that. Oh, my 
god, not that" just before she heara the gunshot (R. 2RO). 
when the gun fired, the bullet struck the door frame 
approximately 5 feet above the floor (R. 246). After passing 
through the door frame, the jacket separated from the slug (R 
247). The jacket struck Nina Fuellernan in the face and the 
slug stuck in the opposite wall and later fell to the floor 
(R .• 219, 225, 24C'). Rob testified that Nina had been upstairs 
-3-
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during the fight an<l that he was not aware she had come 
downstairs until he saw her on the floor after the shot (R. 
299). The.gun had been pointed in Roh's direction when it 
fired, and the bullethole in the door frame was only two feet 
from him (R. 29R, 312). Rob said, however, that he was never 
frightened and that the argument was over by the time he went 
to appellant's bedrOOJT\ ( R. 3 OR-_}09 , 311) • 
A gunsmith testified that the gun involved was in 
perfect conaition (R. 263). The trigger pull had been 
lightened by a gunsmith from the factory setting but was 
average for a rifle that had been worked on by a gunsmith (R. 
263, 2~6). Many rifles have trigger pulls that are as much as 
one pound lighter than this one (R. 266). The triqger pull 
was heavy enough that it would take a conscious effort to pull 
the trigger (R. 263). The rifle coulnn't be fired without 
pulling the trigger and the hammer wouldn't fall without 
pulling the trigger (R. 26R). 
Appellant at first told the police that he and Rob 
were discussing the deer hunt and admiring the gun when it 
went off accidentally (R. 2nq, 300), but appellant did not 
testify at trial. Rob, however, saio that he heard appellant 
tell that story to the police, that it was not true, ann that 
he was surprised when appellant said it (R. 300). Exhihits 
17, 18 and lQ show that the line of fire based on the angle of 
the bullethole through the wall would be consistent with the 
-4-
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rifle being held at or just below the shoulder in an aimed 
position. Conflicting testimony was given indicating that the 




THE TRIAL COURT MAY, AT ITS nISCRETION, 
CONSIDER A LF.SSF.R INCLUnED OFFENSE WHETHER 
REO.UESTED BY DEFF!NSE COUNSEL OR NOT. 
Appellant assigns error to the trial court's 
consideration of a lesser offense incluned within the offense 
chargen because, appellant asserts, it denied him the benefit 
of resting on his theory of the case; i.e., that he was 
totally innocent of any wrongdoing. Such an attempt at 
alleging error has previously been considered and rejected by 
this Court. 
In State v. Howell, Utah, 649 P.2d 91 (1982), the 
defendant, faced with charges of first- and second-degree 
murder ana attempted murner, chose to oppose instructions on 
the lesser included offenses of manslaughter and attempted 
manslaughter in the hope of escaping all criminal liahility. 
This Court, in determining that the trial court could properly 
instruct on the lesser incluc1ea offense, sain: 
If one were to view a trial as a strictly 
adversarial contest or combat between two 
parties, one could argue that a defendant 
-~-
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should have the right to win or lose 
solely on the basis of what the 
prosecution has chargen. However, a 
criminal trial is much more than just a 
contest between the State and an 
individual which is determined by 
strategies appropriate to determining the 
outcome of a game. A primary purpose of a 
criminal trial is the vindication of the 
laws of ·a civilized society against those 
who are guilty of transgressing those 
laws. 
• • • [Wlhen evidence of a defendant's criminal 
conduct has been placed before a court of 
justice, even though that con~uct has not 
been specifically chargeo, it would be a 
mockery of our criminal laws for a court 
to ignore a proved crime and acquit on the 
charged crime, when the defendant is not 
prejudiced in presenting a full ana 
complete defense to the proved crime. 
Id. at 94, 95. The Court went on to say that: 
Under the Utah definition of a lesser 
included offense, there can be no 
unfairness to the defendant in giving a 
lesser included offense in~truction 
because of lack of notice or preparation 
since no element may be includeo in the 
lesser offense that is not included in the 
greater offense [citations and footnote 
omitted]. 
Id. at 95. Thus, the Court held that it is proper for a trial 
court to give a lesser included offense instruction, even 
though the defendant objects, if he is afforded a "full and 
fair opportunity to defend himself." Id. In the instant case 
there was no jury to instruct: however, it is also proper for 
a judge, sitting as the fact finder, to consider a lesser 
included offense when the circumstances of the case indicate 
-6-
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that the defendant may be guilty of the lesser offense even 
though he is not guilty of the offense charged. 
Appellant further claims that the consideration of 
the lesser offense in this case twice placed him in jeopardy 
for the same offense. However, that proposition does not 
apply to the facts of this case. It cannot be sain that 
appellant was placed in double jeopardy where he was not 
acquitted of the charge of manslaughter and then rechargen in 
a new information with that same offense. 'Rather, the 
appellant here was found guilty of a different, lesser offense 
than that chargeo, albeit on the same set of facts, within the 
same proceeoing and without a new information. To hold that 
the finding of guilt in this case constituted nouble jeopardy 
would be to hold that no defendant could ever be found guilty 
of a lesser included offense because the fact finder must 
first find him not guilty of the offense charged. Such a 
result flies in the face of the concepts of justice and fair 
oealing accepted by our courts. See, generally, State v. 
Whitman, q3 Utah 557, 74 P.2~ 6~6 (1Q3~}~ Green v. United 
States, 355 u.s. 184 (1957). 
Appellant further claims that respondent's brief in 
State v. Boggess, Utah, 655 P.2d 6~4 (1982), supports his 
position that the trial court may not consider a lesser 
included offense absent a specific request hy the defendant. 
That case, however, arose in a different context from the case 
at bar. In Boggess, the defendant did not request an 
-7-
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instruction on the lessr included offense and none was given. 
On appeal, the defendant claimed that it was error not to 
consider a lesser offense in such a situation. Boggess, 
therefore, is not apposite to this case. 
POINT II 
NEGLIGF.NT HOMICIDE IS A LESSER OFFENSE 
INCLUOED IN THE OFFENSR OF MANSLAUGHTER. 
Utah Cone Ann., s 76-1-402 (1953), as amended, sets 
out the requirements for lesser includeo offenses. That 
section provides, in pertinent part: 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an 
offense includea in the offense charged 
• • • An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the 
same or less than all the facts required 
to establish the commission of the offense 
charge~. 
Appellant argues that a comparison of the elements of 
manslaughter with the elements of negligent homicide results 
in a finding that neqligent homicide is not a lesser offense 
in manslaughter. Such a comparison, however, results in a 
finding that the difference between the two offenses is merely 
one of degree rather than substance. The elements of 
manslaughter are as follows: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes 
manslaughter if the actor: 
(a) Recklessly causes the death of 
another; or 
-8-
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(b) Causes the death of another under 
the influence of extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance for which there is a 
reasonable explanation or excuse; 
(c) Causes the death of another under 
circumstances where the actor reasonably 
believes the circumstances provide a moral 
or legal justification or extenuation for 
his connuct although the conduct is not 
legally justifiable or excusable under the 
existing circumstances. 
Utah eoae Ann., ~ 76-5-205 (1953), as amended. Negligent 
homicide is defined as follows: 
(1) Criminal ho~icine constitutes 
negligent homicide if the actor, acting 
with criminal negligence, causes the death 
of another. 
Utah Cone Ann., ~ 76-5-206 (19~3), as amended. Appellant 
first contends that negligent ho~icine cannot be a lesser 
included offense of manslaughter because subsections (b) and 
(c) of the manslaughter statute require proof of facts other 
than reckless conauct. There is nothing, however, in the Utah 
Cone that prevents one definition of a crime from including 
lesser offenses that are not incluned within the alternate 
definitions of the greater offense. While negligent homicine 
might not properly be considered where the facts of a 
particular case support either alternative (b) or (c) of ~ 76-
5-205, the facts of this case support only alternative (a). 
There was nothing at trial that showed appellant suffered from 
extreme Mental or emotional disturbance or that appellant felt 
justified in the shooting neath of Nina Fuelle~an. Therefore, 
-9-
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only alternative (a) need be considered in a comparison of the 
two offenses. 
The difference between the two offenses is that 
manslaughter requires the actor to act recklessly and 
negligent homicioe requires criminal negligence. These two 
terms are defined as follows: 
A person engages in conduct: 
• • • (3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with 
respect to circumstances surrounding his 
conduct or the result of his conduct when 
he is aware of but consciously disregards 
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that 
the circumstances exist or the result will 
occur. The risk must be of such a nature 
and degree that its disregard constitutes 
a gross deviation from the standard of 
care that an ordinary person would 
exercise unaer all the circumstances as 
viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is 
criminally negligent with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or 
the result of his conduct when he ought to 
be aware of a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances 
exist or the result will occur. The risk 
must be of such a nature and degree that 
the failure to perceive it constitutes a 
gross deviation from the standard of care 
that an ordinary person would exercise in 
all the circumstances as viewed from the 
actor's standpoint. 
Utah Code Ann.,~ 76-2-103 (1953), as amended. The only 
difference between reckless and criminally negligent conduct 
is whether a person perceives a risk and consciously 
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been aware of. The risk in hoth cases must be of such a 
degree that an ordinary person would not disregard or fail to 
recognize it. The distinction, then, is merely a matter of 
proof of less or more facts estahlishing the mental state of 
the actor and is one of degree; i.e., perception and disr·egard 
or failure to perceive. 
Appellant next cites State v. Howard, Utah, 59; P.2d 
Ai~ (1979) as standing for the proposition that negligent 
homicide is not a lesser offense included in manslaughter. 
That, however, is not the holding of the case. In Howaro, 
this Court said that the failure to instruct on the lesser 
included offense of negligent homicide was not error because 
it was not supported by any reasonable view of the facts in 
that case. This holding does not rule out the inclusion of 
negligent homicide as a lesser offense in other cases, only in 
that case. 
Last, appellant cites to respondP.nt's brief in State 
v. Boggess, supra, to support his position that negligent 
homicide is not a lesser includea offense. Although the 
respondent's brief in that case made a similar argument, it is 
not applicable in the instant case. This Court decided 
Boggess on September 13, lqa2, ana specifically declined to 
decine whether negligent homicine is a lesser included offense 
because no "reasonable view of the evidence as to defenoant's 
intent ••• [would] support a verdict of guilty of negligent 
homicide." Boggess at 6~5. Justice Stewart, in his 
-11-
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concurring opinion, however, arguen that negligent homicide is 
a lesser included offense of manslaughter. He said that: 
The gravamen of the crime of negligent 
homicide is the same as that for reckless 
manslaughter. The only distinction 
between the two crimes is the mental state 
of the defendant at the time the crime was 
committed. In one, the actor perceives 
the risk but unreasonably disregards it; 
in the other, he simply negligently fails 
to perceive the risk. 
• • • 
Courts generally have held that negligent 
homicide is a lesser included offense of 
reckless manslaughter. ~.<;., State v. 
Parker, 128 ~riz. lo;, ~24 ~.2a 304 
(1~80); Lowe v. State, 2~4 Ark. ~05, 570 
~.w.2a ?.53 <l9iR); Till v. People, Colo., 
~Al P.2d 299 (1978); State v. Smith, Conn. 
441 A.2d R4 (1Q81); People v. Strong, 3; 
N.Y.2d 56A, 338 N.E.2d 602, 376 N.Y.S.2d 
87 (197~); ~tate v. Cameron, 121 N.H. 348, 
430 A.2d 138 (19Rl); Aliff v. State, Tex. 
er. App., 62? s.w.2n 166 (19R2). see 
State v. Mattingly, ~3 Or. App. 173, 541 
P.2d 1063 (l9i5). 
Boggess at 65'5, Stewart, J. (concurring). In a further 
clarification, lJustice Stewart stated that: 
The difference between negligence and 
recklessness is not marken by a sharp 
analytical line. On the contrary, the 
difference generally lies in making a 
judgment as to where on a continuum of 
unreasonable conduct one's behavior passes 
from negligence to recklessness. In 
essence, it is a matter of judqing when 
conduct is no longer just gray but dark 
gray. 
Id. at 65R. Because the difference in proof of negligent 
homicide and manslaughter lies merely upon the mental state 
-12-
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of the actor, the former is a lesser offense included within 
the latter. Roth offenses require proof of the same facts 
outside of the mental state. The mental state required for 
negligent homicide is different from that required for 
manslaughter only in degree of perception of the risk. For 
this reason, it was proper for the trial judge, sitting as a 
fact finder, to consider negligent homicide as a lesser 
included offense in this case. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A 
VERDICT OF GUILTY TO THE CHARGE OF 
NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE. 
Lastly, appellant contends that the evidence 
presented at trial is insufficient to justify his conviction 
of negligent homicide as a matter of law. This contention 
presumes that the fact finder must believe the evidence most 
favorable to appellant and ignore that which was unfavorable. 
The mere existence, however, of conflicting evidence or 
inferences is not sufficient to overturn a conviction. It is 
the finner of fact who is entitled to determine the 
credibility of witnesses and weight of the evidence. The 
evidence need not be "wholly conclusive" but neea only he 
sufficient to support a finding by this Court that "reasonable 
minds would [not] entertain a reasonable douht as to guilt." 
see state v. Howell, Utah, 649 P.2d 91, 97 (1982): and cases 
cited therein. 
-13-
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Clearly, there is sufficient evia nee in this case 
to support the verdict. That evidence is that: (1) Appellant 
knew that Nina Fuelleman was somewhere in the house auring the 
argunent between Rob and himself because the three had come 
home together (R. 2R5-2RR); (2) immediately following the 
argument, appellant went to his bedroom and took out the rifle 
(R. 291-2~2); (3) live ammunition was found near where 
appellant was standing when the gun fired, supporting the 
inference that appellant loaded the gun or knew it was loaded 
(R. 241); (4) appellant was pointing the gun in the direction 
of his brother when it fired (R. 312); (5) the gun could not 
have fired unless the trigger were pulled with a conscious 
effort (R. 2~3); (6) the rifle was held at or near the 
shoulner, supporting the inference that appellant was aiming 
or attempting to aim the gun when it fired (R. 297; see also 
Exhibits 17, 18 ann 19); (7) appellant lied to the police 
about why he was holding the gun, supporting the inference 
that the gun aid not fire accidentally (R. 209, 30n); and (0) 
the gun was firen while appellant held it, killing Nina 
Fuelleman (R. 294, 297). 
From these facts, the trial court coulo very well 
have determined that if appellant was not aware of the risk 
that Nina Fuelleman would be killed by the discharge of the 
rifle, he should have been aware of that risk. Even if 
appellant was not aware of the risk that the gun was loaded, 
he should have been aware of that risk and therefore of the 
-14-
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further risk that the gun would fire and someone might be 
killed. Reasonable minds could not entertain a reasonable 
doubt that.appellant was guilty of negligent homicide in 
failing to perceive such a risk. For this reason, the 
judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
It is within the trial junge's discretion to 
consider a lesser included offense where the interests of 
justice require it, even though the defense counsel does not 
request such a consideration and even though he may object. 
Recause negligent homicide is a lesser offense included within 
the offense of manslaughter and there was sufficient evinence 
to support a finding of guilty of negligent homicide, the 
trial court did not err in considering negligent homicide as 
the offense of which appellant was guilty nor in finding him 
guilty. For these reasons, the judgment of the court below 
should be af firmeO. -ft 
Respectfully suhmitted this 10 day of March, 
1983. 
DAVID L. WIL~INSON 
Attorney General 
ROBP.RT N. PARRISH 
Assistant Attorney General 
-15-
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